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When writing about autonomy, we are aware that we are
“join[ing] a conversation that has been ongoing long be-
fore [we] arrived and will continue long after [we]’ve de-
parted” ([1] p. xi). We do not intend to have the final say,
nor do we lose sight of the genuine contestability of the
concept of autonomy. Rather, the aim is to inform the de-
bate by sketching the position of the Swiss-German psy-
chologist Arno Gruen, former professor of psychology at
Rutgers University New Jersey and practicing psychoan-
alyst in Switzerland, and to apply his view to paediatric
practice. Gruen died in 2015, leaving behind a substantial
body of work on autonomy including his ground-breaking
first book “The Betrayal of the Self. Fear of Autonomy
in Men and Women” [2]. In the following, preliminary re-
marks shall be devoted to autonomy to contextualise his
approach.
The principle of autonomy (in paediatrics)
The principle of autonomy (Greek: auto: self, nomos: law)
is based on the recognition that every human being is equal
in dignity and usually refers to the “right to make deci-
sions and act on them freely and without interference” ([3]
p. 252). Thus, a patient can both consent to and refuse
treatments. In bioethics, it is widely accepted that autono-
my is qualified by decision-making capacity, which is es-
sentially understood as a cognitive trait within the person
[3]. Since children are usually considered to lack such ca-
pacity, their decision-making rights are limited and par-
ents act as surrogates [4]. Still, the child should be in-
volved in a developmentally appropriate way [4]. Critiques
have lamented that such a capacity-centred and individual-
istic understanding of autonomy not only disregards indi-
viduals’ embeddedness into relationships, but also deval-
ues highly dependent persons (e.g., children), and therefore
have proposed to recognise autonomy as socially deter-
mined (e.g., relational autonomy) [5]. Consequently, addi-
tional, non-cognitive determinants of autonomy need to be
considered (e.g., relational, emotional) to do more justice
to children.
Autonomy does not only represent a right to which every
human being is inherently entitled. Exercising autonomy
contributes to the development of human faculties, such as
observation, reason and judgement, and is thus constitutive
of human well-being [1]. However, this constituting func-
tion can only come about if there is capacity for autonomy,
which is different from the aforementioned decisional ca-
pacity as a proposed prerequisite for autonomy. Whereas
the later refers to a rather cognitive trait, the former refers
to the ability to be autonomous, which needs to be acquired
and developed, or to say it with the words of the philoso-
pher K. A. Appiah – “autonomy seems to entail a lot more
than just being left to your own devices; it sounds like a
capacity we need to cultivate” ([1] p. 37). Gruen discussed
how capacity for autonomy can be portrayed, and how it
can and why it should be cultivated.
Gruen’s approach to autonomy [2]
In Gruen’s view, the capacity to be autonomous has to be
developed from early infant days onwards and depends on
the child’s life situation. Hence, it requires a given possi-
bility to develop autonomy: a child has to be put in a situ-
ation where she or he learns that there is something to be
learned with respect to her or his own feelings and needs.
Therefore, parents have to empathise with the child, have
to become aware of the child’s attempts to express her or
his needs and, finally, have to respond to them. In that way,
a child learns that her or his needs are significant in so far
as they are recognised and responded to and, consequent-
ly, she or he learns to recognise and to identify with own
feelings and needs. Otherwise, children “learn that there is
nothing to be learned. They learn not to make their own re-
actions the point of departure for their development. This
experience (…) is the decisive factor in the failure to de-
velop autonomy” ([2] p. 4). In this case the child renounces
and betrays her or his true self, desperately adapts to the
external world, and surrenders to the will of others to earn
their (conditional) love. Moreover, Gruen argues that the
submissive child will start to strive for power and learn to
manipulate relationships and the environment, which are
henceforth mainly seen through the lens of domination.
The result is a distorted development, which may persist
throughout life. It is of particular relevance to respond with
empathy and comfort to a child’s feelings of vulnerability
and pain (not with domination and moral authority to con-
trol the child), so that the child learns that these feelings
are not a sign of weakness or something to be ashamed of,
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but that feeling vulnerable is permissible and that painful
feelings are part of one’s inner self [6]. If a child fails to
accept these emotions, then she or he will use power over
others as a way to escape from such feelings.
Being autonomous, as understood by Gruen, is a twofold
emotional capacity. First, an individual needs access to his
or her inner voice, and needs to be “able to experience
freely one’s own perceptions, feelings, and needs” ([2] p.
xv), a capacity which can be developed as described above:
through empathetic parental care. Second, these feelings
need to be integrated within the psyche of the individual.
This mental procedure of harmonising all aspects of the
personality for Gruen results in the attainment of personal
integration. Gruen understands autonomy thus as the “state
of integration in which one lives in full harmony with one’s
feelings and needs” ([2] p. 1). Correspondingly, to be au-
tonomous means to (1) experience (not suppress) and (2)
integrate (not dissociate) own feelings and needs (fig. 1).
In this state of self-acceptance, a person has access to life-
affirming emotions, may they be negative (e.g. sorrow, de-
spair) or positive (e.g. joy, confidence).
It is noteworthy that Gruen’s perspective inheres a “choice
that is made for children (…) whether the development of
the self (…) will be formed by inner or by outer forces –
in other words, whether they will live an autonomous ex-
istence or one dependent on external stimulation” ([2] p.
6). If the child is allowed to make these formative experi-
ences, she or he (as well as the later adult) is likely to be
able to be autonomous, which, as Gruen emphasises, “does
not result from having ideas of one’s own importance, nor
from the necessity for independence” ([2] p. xv).
Significance for paediatrics
The lesson we can learn is to rethink autonomy as a capac-
ity which unfolds within the individual. In medicine, au-
tonomy is commonly equated with „the state of being inde-
pendent, free, and self-directing” [7] and with “the right to
hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on
personal values and beliefs” ([8] p. 63). Such understand-
ings relate to social situations (making decisions indepen-
dent of and free from interferences) in which persons show
behaviour and thereby express preferences (self-directing
through taking actions). Following Gruen, this represents
a mistaken understanding, because autonomy occurs with-
in the individual, prior to making choices and taking ac-
tions, and is, in the form of the abovementioned state of
personal integration, a sine qua non of any truly self-gov-
erned choice or action. Autonomy, as understood by Gru-
en, is different from and precedes what is frequently equat-
ed with autonomy.
Although it is mainly a parental responsibility to create
situations in which children can develop autonomy and a
societal duty to facilitate this endeavour, practitioners can
and should support parents in developing children’s auton-
omy. Certainly, Gruen’s approach to autonomy in children
is worth utilising in paediatric practice, but also beyond
in daily interaction with children. For paediatric health-
care professionals, the imperatives are manifold: support
the development of autonomy. Respond unconditionally to
children’s needs and feelings, thereby enhance their ca-
pacity to experience them. Actively encourage children to
accept their needs and feelings, thereby enhance their ca-
pacity to integrate them. In concrete terms, parents and
paediatric healthcare professionals can meaningfully oper-
ationalise Gruen’s viewpoint by allowing and encouraging
the child to express her or his whole spectrum of emotions,
particularly feelings of vulnerability and pain. The younger
the child is, the more important it is to support the develop-
ment of children’s integrative capacity, since children be-
come less susceptible for such formative experiences with
increasing age.
Gruen’s perspective adds to our current understanding of
children’s autonomy, first, because he offers a different un-
derstanding and, second, because he considers how auton-
omy can be developed. His view is especially valuable,
since the possibility and responsibility to enhance auton-
omy in children might be neglected in paediatric practice
owing to a focus on assessing whether or not the child has
decisional capacity (fig. 1). A child who is attuned to her
or his inner self is likely to reach her or his full potential.
As Martha Welch correctly points out “not only can [such
a child] maneuver through a hostile environment, [she or]
Figure 1: Arno Gruen’s understanding of autonomy.
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he can fulfill [her or] his potential, [her or] his dreams, and
enjoy the journey as well.” ([6] p. 139). Ultimately, allow-
ing children an autonomous self by allowing them to de-
velop in an emotionally integrated way means to enhance
their personal health.
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